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Résumé: Cet article contribue au débat sur le progrès technique biaisé en analysant la dynamique de 
l'offre de travail qualifié et l'inégalité salariale dans un modèle de croissance endogène avec 
progrès technique biaisé en faveur des capacités. En raison d'un effet de découragement, 
l'augmentation des inégalités intra groupes réduit l'incitation à s'éduquer pour ceux qui ont des 
capacités ordinaires. Ce mécanisme induit une relation non monotone entre le taux de 
croissance de l'économie et l'offre de travail qualifié, phénomène qui s'est manifesté dans 
certains grands pays de l'OCDE au cours des années 1970 et 1980.  
 
Abstract: This article contributes to the debate on skill-biased technical change by studying the 
dynamics of skill supply and wage inequality in an endogenous growth model with ability-
biased technical progress. Due to a discouragement effect, rising within groups inequality 
reduces incentives to become educated for ordinary-ability workers. This mechanism 
generates a non-monotonic relationship between the growth rate and skill supply driving wage 
inequality upward during periods of accelerating technical change. This theoretical 
explanation is consistent with the apparent negative relationship between the relative skill 
supply and premium in the 1970s and 1980s in major OECD countries. 
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1  Introduction 
 
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the dynamics of skill supply and wage 
inequality in an endogenous growth model with ability-biased technical progress. 
Combined with the signalling role of education, such an ability-bias may imply a 
discouragement effect to become educated for workers with ordinary ability. In turn, a 
negative relationship between skill supply and growth could characterize periods of 
widening within-groups inequality like the new information and communication 
technologies revolution. 
This theoretical explanation is consistent with the behaviour of skill supply, and the 
wage premium during the 1970s and 1980s in the United States and Great Britain, and 
with the evolution of the growth rate of the GDP and the growth rate of labour supply 
since the 1970s in major OECD countries, as documented in details in section 2. The 
model proposed formalizes ability-biased technical change in a dynamic framework 
where workers’ human capital is determined both by technological progress and ability, 
and the efficiency units supplied by the most able are not influenced by the 
technological level but by its growth rate, in the spirit of Galor and Moav’s (2000) basic 
argument. But our approach then focuses on the negative relationship between technical 
change and skilled labour supply induced by ability-biased technical change. Indeed, 
ability-biased innovations cause a smaller fraction of workers with ordinary ability to 
choose to become educated by reducing the relative returns to skills for such workers. 
We propose a dynamic general equilibrium framework with endogenous technical 
change to analyze the non-monotonic response of skill-supply to wage inequality both 
between and within groups. 
The argument that skill supply do matter in the evolution of biased technical change 
and wage inequality has echoes in two kinds of models skill-biased technical change. A 
first category of models considers the impact of skill supply on wage inequality. In 
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Acemoglu (1998), the rise in the supply of skills is the source of skill-biased technical 
change, but supply itself is not influenced by the rate of technological progress. In 
Eicher & García-Peñalosa (2001), a direct effect of an increase in the relative supply is 
to reduce the skill premium, but an indirect effect is to generate more innovations and 
therefore a higher demand for skilled workers to absorb new technologies. Supply hence 
is crucial, but its effects are ambiguous. In Galor & Tsiddon (1997), the supply of 
skilled labour is likely to decline along the lifecycle of technology. During periods of 
major technological change (inventions), the returns to ability increase, which increases 
inequality and relative supply. Yet, once technologies become more accessible (with 
innovations), the returns to ability decline, thereby reducing inequality and relative 
supply. However, a low skill supply response is not contemporaneous to periods of 
major technological breakthroughs. 
A second category of models analyzes the inverse and equivocal effect of biased 
technical change on skill supply. In this retrospect, the present paper is closer to Eicher 
(1996) who explains the positive links between technological progress and the relative 
wage on the one hand, and the long-term inverse fluctuations in the relative supply and 
wage of skilled labour on the other hand. In his model, the non monotonic relationships 
between supply, demand and relative wages are driven by an absorption effect. The 
absorption of bursts in technological progress requires the withdrawal of skilled labour 
from research and education, which subsequently increases the costs of both human 
capital investment and innovation 1 . The incentives to accumulate human capital and 
the supply of skilled labour is reduced, which depresses growth. A higher rate of 
technological change can therefore reduce the stock of human capital, and higher 
relative wages can lead to a decline in the supply of skilled labour. The absorption cost 
of new technologies hence allows for inverse movements in the relative wage and 
supply of skilled labour in response to accelerations in technological change. 
This article proposes a model that analyzes the skilled labour supply response to 
ability-biased technological change. Following Rubinstein & Tsiddon (1997), inequality 
both within and between education groups comes from the same source: the rise in the 
returns to ability. When it increases the returns to education, technological progress rises 
the productivity of skilled labour, independently individual ability. This mechanism 
explains the contemporaneous rise in both wage inequality between groups and relative 
skilled labour supply (since the incentives to become educated is higher). But when 
technological progress increases the returns to ability, it reduces, among those who 
choose to become educated, the productivity of the least able. The positive relationship 
between technical change and wage inequality within groups then reduces the relative 
supply of educated labour, thereby driving wage inequality upward. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports empirical evidence available 
for major OECD countries regarding the evolution of the growth rates of GDP and 
labour supply, and the relative percentile distribution of earnings since the 1970s.  
Section 3 presents the basic structure of the model. Section 4 defines the general 
competitive equilibrium and section 5 analyzes the impact of ability-biased technical 
change on skill supply and wage inequality. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
1Using a similar argument, Lloyd-Ellis (1999) shows that this absorption effect reduces innovation and 
growth. 
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2  Empirical evidence in major OECD countries  
 
In this section, I provide some evidence indicating that in most OECD countries, 
periods of high growth rates of the GDP seem to go along with periods of slow and even 
decline of the growth rate of labour supply, suggesting a non-monotonic relationship 
between skill supply and biased-technical change, as developed in this paper. 
The growth rates of the Gross Domestic Product and labour supply  are  reported for 
the major OECD countries in the following figures (drawn from Tables I and II in 
appendix 7.1). Only comparable data have been reported, in particular regarding the 
available years for each type of data. This in turn reduced the number of OECD 
countries to be taken into account. Nevertheless, data related to the major industrial 
countries (the G-7 countries)  since the 1970s were available and are reported in this 
section .  
Following Prescott (2004), the labour supply measure considered is the number of 
hours worked per person aged 15-64 in the taxed market sector. However, as pointed out 
in the OECD employment outlook, the absolute values of such a variable may not be 
comparable between countries, hence it is the evolution of such a variable that matters. 
This precisely fits the goal of this paper which focuses on the links between the growth 
rates of labour supply and GDP during different phases of the growth process.   
Figure 1: Average growth rates of GDP and labour supply in major industrialized 
countries, 1970-90 
Source: OECD Productivity Database (2004), and Employment Outlook (1996, 2003) 
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These figures emphasize the fact that the growth rate of GDP and labour supply seem to 
be negatively correlated for most of the major industrialized countries. More precisely, 
two groups of countries can be distinguished. 
• The first group is composed of Australia, Canada, Norway, Spain and Sweden. 
These countries are characterized by a complete negative relationship between the 
growth rate of GDP and labour supply since the 1970s. Between the 1970s and the 
1980s, Canada, Norway, Spain and Sweden experienced a decline in the growth rate of 
the GDP, together with an increase in the growth rate of labour supply, a phenomenon 
which reversed between the 1980s and the 1990s. Australia was characterized by the 
same negative relationship but not during the same decades. 
• The second group of countries is composed of Finland, France, United States, United 
Kingdom, Germany and Japan. 
These countries have faced an apparent similar evolution of the growth rate of both the 
GDP and labour supply. However, since the 1970s, labour supply has been declining (its 
growth rate being permanently negative), while the growth rate of the GDP has 
remained positive. Hence, if there is any correlation between both variables, it is not a 
positive one. Besides, when taking a closer look at the figures, on average, the lowest 
decline in the growth rate of labour supply comes during a period in which the growth 
rate of the GDP was the highest (1970s) and vice versa during the 1990s which was a 
period characterized by the highest (lowest) decline in the growth rate of labour supply 
(GDP). 
Regarding the behaviour of skill supply and the wage premium during the 1970s and 
1980s, Katz and Murphy (1992) and Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998) observe that in 
the United States, the largest increase in the supply of skilled workers comes during the 
1971-1979 period in which the skill premium declined. Inversely, the smallest growth of 
the supply comes during the 1979-1987 period in which the skill premium expanded 
sharply. Gregg & Manning (1997) observe a similar pattern in Great Britain between 
1975 and 1993. This apparent inverse relationship between relative supplies and demand 
for skills is reproduced in Figure 2 for nine OECD countries (drawn from Tables II and 
III in appendix 7.1). 
For Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998), in the absence of policies facilitating 
substantial growth in post-secondary education at both the college and university levels, 
Canada would have experienced an increase in wage inequality between groups similar 
to that observed in the United States. Similarly, Nickell and Bell (1996) report that the 
relative wages of the unskilled have not fallen in Germany but have fallen substantially 
in Britain and the United States. They conclude that it would be a far higher education 
and training level in the bottom half of the ability range that would have enabled the 
German economy to respond to demand shifts toward the skilled in a more robust 
fashion. If the relative earnings of more- and less-educated workers do respond to 
changes in their relative supply, the acceleration in skill-biased technical associated with 
the “NICT revolution” may not have induced a sufficient response in supply to 
compensate the rise in relative wages. 
Hence, for major OECD countries, the data available seem to highlight that the 
highest growth rate of the GDP on average comes during periods in which the growth of 
labour supply is the lowest, and the wage premium is declining, and vice versa. In other 
words, this evidence suggests a negative correlation between growth and skill supply on 
average since the 1970s in major OECD countries. 
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Figure 2: Average annual growth rates of Labour Supply and Relative Percentile 
(P90/P10) of gross earnings. 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics (July 2004) and Employment Outlooks (1996, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
1973-1979 1979-1983 1983-1990 1990-2000
United Kingdom
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1973-1979 1979-1983 1983-1990 1990-2000
France
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
1973-1979 1979-1983 1983-1990 1990-2000
Canada
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1973-1979 1979-1983 1983-1990 1990-2000
Sweden
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
1973-1979 1979-1983 1983-1990 1990-2000
Finland
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1973-1979 1979-1983 1983-1990 1990-2000
Australia
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1973-1979 1979-1983 1983-1990 1990-2000
Italy
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
1973-1979 1979-1983 1983-1990 1990-2000
Germany
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
1973-1979 1979-1983 1983-1990 1990-2000
Labour Supply P90/P10 
 6
 
3  The model 
 
The framework builds upon the basic Romer (1990)’s model in an overlapping 
generations framework where individuals live for two periods. In the first period, 
individuals choose to become educated or not and are then employed as unskilled or 
skilled workers. In the second period, individuals retire consuming their savings. The 
economy is composed of a final good sector, an intermediate goods sector and a 
research sector. The final good can be used for consumption (of households), investment 
(research) and intermediate goods production. The research sector produces innovations 
which are commercialized and sold by intermediate good producers to the final good 
sector. Labour is employed only in final good manufacturing. 
 
3.1  The final good sector 
The final good is the numeraire. It is produced in a competitive environment using 
skilled workers, tH , unskilled workers, tL  and intermediate goods ( )tx i  according to 
the following technology:  
 
 ( ) ( )(1 ) 1
0
( )tnt t t tY H L x i di
αβ α β β− −
= ∫  (1) 
where 0 1α< < , 0 1β< <  and tn  is the number of intermediate goods produced in 
every period. Profit maximization by a representative firm in this sector leads to the 
following inverse demand for factors of production:  
 
 , , ( ) ( )
s ut t t
t t t
t t t
Y Y Y
w w p i
H L x i
∂ ∂ ∂
= = =
∂ ∂ ∂
 (2) 
with stw  the wage rate per efficiency unit of skilled labour, 
u
tw  the wage rate per 
efficiency unit of unskilled labour and ( )tp i  the price of intermediate good i . 
3.2  The intermediate goods sector 
The intermediate goods sector is monopolistic: once a good is invented in the research 
sector, an intermediate goods firm can produce it provided it buys the corresponding 
patent (or licence) to the innovator. We assume that intermediate goods are produced 
using final good, according to a one-for-one technology ( ( )tx i  units of intermediate 
good i  requires ( )tx i  units of final good). Given the inverse demand for intermediate 
goods in the final good sector, the optimization program for firm [0, ]ti n∈  writes:  
( ) ( )(1 ) 1
( )
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
t
t t t t t t t t
x i
i p i x i x i H L x i x iαβ α β βpi β − −= − = − − . 
The first-order condition of this program yields:  
 
 
2/ 11( ) , ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) , ( )
1 1t t t t t t t t t
p i p x i x H L i xβ α α ββ pi piβ β
−
= = = = − = =
− −
. (3) 
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Hence intermediate goods producers are symmetric in equilibrium. 
3.3  The research sector 
We consider that firms’ lifetime is finite. In standard models of growth with expanding 
product variety, patents are infinitely-lived. In our framework, this assumption implies 
that patents can be sold at the end of each period. There are two ways to produce an 
intermediate good: either buy a patent on a pre-existing product ( tn  firms), or buy a 
patent on a new variety ( 1t tn n+ −  firms). Firms willing to enter the market by purchasing 
an existing patent have to pay an entry cost equal to the patent price. Firms willing to 
enter by inventing a new variety have to devote resources to deliberate R&D. The R&D 
process is deterministic and requires to spend F  units of final good to introduce a new 
variety2. 
Entry decisions in period t  are made in period 1t − . The price that a potential 
entrant will be willing to pay for an existing patent, 1(1 )et tv r− + , with tr  the interest rate, 
must equal the present value of profits earned by an intermediate good producer in 
period t , tpi  augmented with the market price of the patent at the end of the period, 
e
tv . 
The value of a patent therefore writes:  
 
 1 1
e
e t t
t
t
v
v
r
pi
−
+
=
+
 (4) 
Free-entry in the research sector implies:  
 
 ( )e et tv i F v= =  (5) 
Equations (4) and (5) together determine the interest rate of the economy: 
( )t tr F Fpi= + .The overall investment level in period t  is composed of the amount of 
resources dedicated to the acquisition of existing patents, et tn v  and the amount of 
resources devoted to creating new varieties, 1( )t tn n F+ − . Hence, 1( )et t t t tI n v n n F+= + − . 
Using the free-entry condition then implies the following investment level:  
 
 1t tI n F+=  (6) 
                                                 
2
 The assumption that R&D requires resources expressed in terms of final good is common to models 
based  on the standard framework of Grossmn and Helpman (1991). This assumption makes sense in the 
present model because we model labour supply decision in terms of educational choices and not 
occupational choices. Relaxing this assumption and assuming instead that educated labour is the input of 
the R&D process would induce a mobility condition for skilled workers that is, in equilibrium, an 
indifference condition between working in the final good or in the research sector. This would not change 
the endogenous allocation of the workforce between skilled and unskilled labour, but would only make 
the skilled wage dependent on the patent price, that is in fine, on the price and quantity of intermediate 
goods. Since the research process remains deterministic in such kind of models, given the equilibrium 
conditions developed in section 4 (see equation 11), this  would not change the qualitative results of the 
model. In a different framework, based on the model proposed by Aghion and Howitt (1992), Crifo-Tillet 
and Lehmann (2004) analyze such a mobility condition, considering an endogenous labour supply based 
on an occupational choice. In this framework, the model becomes more complex but the qualitative results 
still hold. 
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3.4  Labour market and resources constraints 
The size of the population is normalized to one. Individuals differ in their ability: they 
can have either high ability or ordinary ability. The distribution of ability is fixed and 
exogenous. However, individuals can acquire education, so that the allocation of 
workers between skilled and unskilled labour is endogenous. Let M  denote the 
proportion of workers that have high ability. We denote by tE  (respectively tO ) the 
fraction of workers with high (respectively ordinary) ability who choose to become 
educated. Resources constraints on the labour market then write:  
 
 1 with (1 )
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
se
t t
se so u so
t t t t t
u
t t t
N ME
N N N N M O
N M E M O
 =

+ + ≡ = −

= − + − −
 (7) 
where setN  (respectively sotN ) is the number of skilled workers with high (respectively 
ordinary) ability, and utN  is the number of unskilled workers. 
 
3.5  Households’ decisions 
Preferences of an individual j  in generation t  are represented by the following utility 
function: 11 2 1( ) ( ) , 0 1i j jt t tu c cφ φ φ− += < <  where 1jtc  is the first period consumption, 2 1jtc +  
is the second period consumption and φ  is the expenditure share for second period 
consumption. In the first period, individuals make two decisions: becoming educated or 
not and saving for the second period consumption. Savings decisions are made 
according to the following program:  
 
 
1 2 1
11
1 2 1
,
2 1 1
max ( ) ( ) . .
(1 )j jt t
j j j
t t tj j j
t t t j jc c
t t t
c s
u c c s t
c r s
φ φ
+
−
+
+ +
Ω = +
= 
= +
 (8) 
where jts  denotes saving, 1tr +  is the interest rate and 
j
tΩ  is the income net of education 
costs. 
Given the distribution of ability, the choice of becoming educated allows workers 
with high (respectively ordinary) ability to supply tk  efficiency units of labour 
(respectively tl  efficiency units of labour). Individuals who choose not to acquire skills 
supply tm  efficiency units of labour. We assume that the number of efficiency units of 
unskilled labour is independent of ability to capture the idea that unskilled workers are 
employed in simple, routine jobs which do not allow them to take advantage of their 
intrinsic competencies. In contrast, skilled workers are employed in complex jobs which 
enable those with high ability to exploit their comparative advantage and supply higher 
efficiency units of labour. Parameters k , l  and m  are such that  
 
 t t tk l m> ≥  (A1) 
The inequality t tk l>  captures returns to ability. It means that the productivity 
(efficiency units of labour) of individuals with high ability who choose to become 
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educated is higher than the productivity of individuals with ordinary ability who choose 
to become educated. The inequality t tl m≥  captures returns to skills as it implies that 
unskilled workers supply lower efficiency units of labour than skilled workers. Ability 
and education hence are complement inputs in the formation of human capital as in 
Becker (1975)’s theory of human capital. Given both kinds of returns, the earnings of 
individuals, based on wage rates per efficiency unit of labour, are given by:  
 
 , ,
se s so s u u
t t t t t t t t tW k w W l w W m w= = =  (9) 
The cost of education is such that individuals who choose to become skilled workers 
devote a fraction 0 1d< <  of their unit-time endowment to the formation of human 
capital3 . Individuals who choose to become skilled supply a fraction (1 )d−  of their 
potential efficiency units of skilled labour. Expected incomes of each category of 
workers then write: , (1 ) , (1 )u u se se so sot t t t t tW d W d WΩ = Ω = − Ω = − . 
 
The assumption that educated workers with ordinary ability are less efficient than 
educated workers with high ability models the signaling role of education first explored 
by Spence (1973). Stated differently, education act as a signal of ability and differences 
in educational attainment arise as a consequence of heterogeneity in ability. Willen, 
Hendel and Shapiro (2004) consider a model where, when households face credit 
constraints, lack of education could mean either low ability, or high ability and low 
financial resources. Despite the difference in their modelling strategy, their  results are 
not in contradiction with the present model. In their model indeed, the wage of 
uneducated workers reflect the mix of abilities: the smaller the proportion of high-ability 
persons in the uneducated pool, the lower the wage for unskilled labour. In turn, 
improving opportunities for higher education, either by providing direct grants for 
tuition or by reducing the interest rate that households pay to borrow for an education, 
more high-ability workers get an education and the quality of the unskilled pool drops, 
lowering the unskilled wage. Besides, they show that considering an additional 
productivity-enhancing aspect to education do not change their basic results. 
 
Individuals’ utility function is defined over first and second period consumption and 
is strictly increasing in both variables. Given that individuals work only in the first 
period, maximizing first period income is a necessary condition for maximizing utility. 
In other words, individuals choose to become skilled workers if the skilled income is 
higher than the unskilled one. In the present model, individuals with ordinary ability 
then choose to become skilled workers as long as their expected income as skilled 
workers, sotΩ  is higher than that of unskilled workers, 
u
tΩ . In equilibrium, this condition 
is binding, implying that the number of workers with ordinary ability who choose to 
become educated satisfies the following indifference condition: so ut tΩ = Ω . Regarding 
individuals with high ability, the assumption that t tk l>  implies that 
se so
t tW W> , 
therefore se sot tΩ > Ω . Education decisions in turn satisfy the following rule: 
                                                 
3This fraction is identical for all individuals, whatever their ability, differences between workers being 
captured by the returns to skills and ability. d represents the cost of education, expressed in terms of units 
of time necessary for the formation of human capital.  
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se so u
t t tΩ > Ω = Ω which implies that, all individuals with high ability choose to become 
educated:   1tE =             (10) 
 
 
4  Competitive general equilibrium 
A competitive general equilibrium for this economy in every period t is characterized by 
the following conditions. 
• Firms in the final good sector determine the quantity of inputs (skilled labour, 
unskilled labour and intermediate goods) that maximize profits. This yields the inverse 
demand functions (2):  
 
 , (1 ) , (1 )s ut t tt t t
t t t t
Y Y Y
w w p
H L n x
αβ α β β= = − = −  (11) 
 
• Firms in the intermediate goods sector are symmetric. Price and quantities produced 
in equilibrium are given by equations (3). 
 
• Firms in the research sector enter the market either by purchasing a patent on 
previous products ( tn ) or by developing new products ( 1t tn n+ − ). All profit opportunities 
are exploited in equilibrium and the investment level is given by equation (6). 
 
• Education decisions are such that all individuals with high ability choose to become 
educated:  1tE = , and on the other hand, given the rule 
se so u
t t tΩ > Ω = Ω , workers 
with ordinary ability are indifferent between becoming educated or not. The ratio 
so u
t tΩ Ω  therefore satisfies the following condition:  
 
 
11
1
so s
t t t
u u
t t t
l w
m w d
Ω
= ⇔ =
Ω −
 (12) 
• Equilibrium on the labour market implies equality between demand and supply in 
efficiency units:  
 
 ,
se so u
t t t t t t t tH k N l N L m N= + =  (13) 
The number tO  of workers with ordinary ability that choose to become educated is 
determined using equations (12) 1
1
s
t t
u
t t
l w
m w d
=
−
  where the skill premium 
s
t
u
t
w
w
 is obtained 
using equations (2), (7) and (13):   (1 )(1 )
1 1 (1 )
s
t t t t
u
t t t t t
w L m M O
w H k M l M O
α α
α α
− −
= =
− − + −
 (14) 
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(1 )(1 ) 1
1 (1 ) 1
t t
t t t
m M O
k M l M O d
α
α
− −
= ⇔
− + − −
  
(1 )
1 1
(1 ) 1
1
t
t
t
k Md
l MO
d
α
α
α
α
− −
− −
=
− +
−
     (15) 
 
• Individuals determine the level of consumption and savings that maximize their 
intertemporal utility, subject to the budget constraints according to (8). This leads to the 
following individual saving function: i jt ts φ= Ω , with φ  the marginal propensity to save 
(around 10% on average in OECD countries). 
Aggregate savings is then given by :  
 
 ( ) ( )(1 ) (1 )u u se se so so s se s so u ut t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tS N N N d k w N d l w N w m Nφ φ= Ω + Ω + Ω = − + − +  
Using the labour market clearing condition (equation 13), one gets:  
( )(1 ) 1 (1 ) su s u t tt t t t t t t u
t t
w HS w L d w H w L d
w L
φ φ  = + − = + − 
 
 
Substituting for the skill premium 
1
s
t t
u
t t
w L
w H
α
α
=
−
 (equation 14), we get:  
1 (1 )
1
u
t t tS w L d
αφ
α
 
= + − 
− 
. Replacing utw  by its value in (11), one has then: 
(1 ) 1 (1 )
1t t
S d Yαφ α β
α
 
= − + − 
− 
, and using the fact that 
1
t t t
t
n p xY β= −  (see 11), 
aggregate savings is such that: (1 ) 1 (1 )
1 1t t t t
S d n p xα β αφ β α
−  
= + − 
− − 
. 
Finally, using equations (3):  
2 2
1 11 (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
1t t t t t t
p x H L H L
β
α α α αβ ββ ββ
−
− −
= − = −
−
,  
savings write:  
 
2(1 )
1(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
1t t t t
S d n H L
β
α αβ αφ β α β
α
−
−
 
= − − + − 
− 
 (16) 
 
• Equilibrium on the goods market implies equality between aggregate saving and 
investment: t tS I= .  
Equalizing (16) and (6), implies:  
 
 
2(1 )
1
1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )1t t t tn F d n H L
β
α αβ αφ β α β
α
−
−
+
 
= − − + − 
− 
 
The growth rate is defined as follows: 
2(1 )
11
11 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )1
t
t t t
t
ng d H L
n F
β
α αβφ αβ α β
α
−
−+
+
 
+ = = − − + − 
− 
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Substituting for tH  and tL  by their values defined in equations (7) and (13), one gets: 
( ) ( )12(1 ) 1 11 (1 )1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )1t t t t t t
dg d k M l M O m M O
F
α αβ α αφ αβ β α
α
−
− − −
+
− 
+ = − − − + + − − − 
− 
Replacing tO  by its value given in equation (15) we get after simplifications:  
 
( )
1
2(1 ) 1 1
1
(1 )1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
1
t
t t t
t
mdg d k M l M
F l
α
β α αφ αβ β α
α
−
− − −
+
 
− 
+ = − − − + + −  
−  
 (17) 
 
 
5  Skill supply and ability-biased technical change 
To analyze the impact of ability-biased technical change on skill supply and relative 
wages, we first consider a stationary environment where parameters k , l  and m are 
constant and we determine the impact of a shock increasing the returns to ability k l . 
Two inequality indexes can be defined: wage inequality within skilled workers, denoted 
by /s uΓ , and wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, denoted by sΓ .  
 
The average income of skilled workers is defined by the income (in efficiency units) of 
skilled workers, divided by the size of the skilled work force: 
se so
s st t t t
t tse so
t t
k N l NW w
N N
+
=
+
. 
Similarly, the average income of unskilled workers is given by: 
u
u u ut t
t t t tu
t
m NW w m w
N
= =  
Wage inequality within groups is defined by:  
(1 ) 11 1
(1 )1 1
1 1
se se
s t t t t
so so
tt t t t t
t
d
N W k kM M
kd MN W l M O l M
l M
α
α
α
α
−
+
−Γ = = =
−
− −
−
− −
 (18)    
Between groups inequality writes: /
se so
t t t t
s se so
ts u t t
u u
t tt
k N l N
N NW
m wW
+
+Γ = =  
Hence, given the resources constraints (7): / (1 )(1 )
s
s u t t t t
u
t t t
k M l M O w
M M O m w
+ −Γ =
+ −
 
Substituting for 
s
t
u
t
w
w
 (equation 14) and tO  (equation 15) we have after simplifications:  
/
1 1
1(1 )(1 )
1 (1 ) (1 ) 1
1
s u
kM
lM O
kM M O d M
l
α
αα
αα
α
  
− +  
−− −   Γ = =
− + −  
− − − 
−  
 (19) 
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Proposition 1. A shock increasing the returns to ability /k l  induces a decline in the 
number of workers with ordinary ability who choose to become educated and an 
increase in wage inequality both between groups and within skilled workers. 
 
Proof: immediate from equations (15), (18) and (19).  ⁫ 
 
k l measures the returns to ability as it is the ratio of the income of skilled workers with 
high ability to the income of skilled workers with ordinary ability ( se soΩ Ω ). An 
increase in the returns to ability reduces the number of workers with ordinary ability 
who choose to become educated via a productivity effect. When the returns to skills for 
workers with high ability increases, this is equivalent in this framework to a reduction in 
the returns to skills for workers with ordinary ability. Firms are incited to save workers 
relatively less productive and increase their demand for the most productive workers. 
The supply of skilled labour by workers with ordinary ability adjusts downward. This 
effect is responsible for the increase in wage inequality between groups (see 19). 
Intuitively, a higher k l  implies that high-ability workers provide lots of efficiency 
units of skilled labour, which tends to depress the wage and hence the income of 
ordinary-ability agents if they become skilled. 
From (18), we see that an increase in the returns to ability increases wage inequality 
within skilled workers through two effects. On the one hand, there is a direct income 
effect through the increase in the efficiency of high-ability relatively to ordinary-ability 
workers ( k l ). On the other hand, there is an indirect supply effect (1 O ). The reduction 
in the number of workers with ordinary ability who choose to become educated 
reinforces the upward pressure on the relative income of high-ability workers. 
In Eicher (1996)’s model, skill-biased technical change exerts a negative impact on 
the cost of accumulation of human capital. The relative wage of skilled workers is 
determinant both in the cost of absorbing new technologies in production and in the 
formation of human capital. A higher rate of technological progress rises the relative 
wage of skilled workers (and hence inequality between groups) and reduces the number 
of skilled workers in the education sector. This reduces the incentives to become 
educated. In the present model, the rise in wage inequality within groups reduces the 
marginal benefit of education for individuals with ordinary ability. It is as if the 
opportunity cost of education for these individuals was rising in the presence of within 
groups inequality, inducing a discouragement effect. A rise in the relative wage of 
skilled workers is compatible with a decrease in the relative supply of skilled labour, 
and the inverse relationship between supply and demand stems from within groups 
inequality which reduces the incentives to become educated for ordinary-ability 
workers. 
We turn now to the analysis of ability-biased technical change. We consider that 
technological change exerts an erosion effect on the efficiency units of labour supplied 
by unskilled and ordinary-ability workers. Intuitively, the faster the rate of technological 
change, the more one has to cope with tasks and situations not previously encountered. 
Such an instable environment demands ability to adapt and learn. Even for more 
educated individuals, the lower the ability, the lower the productive efficiency in an 
environment that changes rapidly. To formalize this erosion effect, we consider that the 
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number of efficiency units of labour supplied by unskilled and ordinary-ability workers 
are decreasing in the rate of technological progress. In contrast, the number of efficiency 
units of labour supplied by high-ability workers is not depreciated by technological 
progress. The returns to skills are therefore such that:  
, (1 ), (1 )
with (.) (.), (.) (.) 0
t t t t tk k l g m gλ µ
λ µ λ µ
= = + = +
′ ′> ≤ <
       (20) 
The erosion effect is such that l
t
 and m
t
 are decreasing with the rate of technical 
change. Technical change is ability-biased because the efficiency units of labour 
supplied by the most able workers are constant both in a stationary and a non-stationary 
environment. Technical change is also such that the efficiency units of skilled workers 
with ordinary-ability workers are decreasing at a higher pace compared to unskilled 
workers. This assumption captures the fact that in a rapidly changing environment, 
skilled jobs based on non-repetitive, interactive tasks impose tighter constraints on 
cognitive ability, thereby depreciating more rapidly the returns to a signalling education 
system for ordinary ability workers, while unskilled jobs, based on repetitive routine 
tasks, though being costly in terms of adaptation to new technological environments, 
imply a flatter depreciation rate. This argument is consistent with the observation on 
OECD data that workplaces where few or no qualifications are required are less likely to 
have adapted to new technological and organizational environments (see OECD 
Employment Outlook, 1999).  
Given (20), the economy’s growth rate writes: 
  [ ]
1
1
(1 )1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )
t
t t
t
gg kM M g
g
αµγ λλ
−
+
 +
+ = + − + 
+ 
     (21) 
where 2(1 ) 1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1
1
d d
F
β α αφ αγ β β α
α
− − −
 
= − − − − + 
− 
 is such that  
 
( ) ( )1 1(1) / (1) (2) / (2)
(1 ) (1) (1 ) (2)kM M kM M
α αλ µ λ µγλ λ
− −
< <
+ − + −
 (A2) 
This assumption guarantees that the steady-state growth rate belongs to the unit interval. 
 
Lemma 1 Under assumption (A2) and given (19), there exists a unique steady-state rate 
of technical change (0,1)g ∈ . The economy converges with oscillations to g  for all 
0 (0,1)g ∈ . 
Proof. see appendix 7.2. ⁫ 
Figure 3 reproduces the dynamics of the economy’s growth rate. The evolution of 
inequality and skill supply along the transition toward the steady-state are described in 
the following proposition. 
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Proposition 2 Along the transition to the steady-state, ability-biased technical change 
exerts a non monotonic pressure on wage inequality both between and within groups, 
and on the number of individuals with ordinary ability who choose to become educated. 
Proof. After substituting (21) into (17), (19) and (20), these results are corollaries of 
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1. ⁫ 
 
Figure 3: Dynamics of the growth rate with ability-biased technical change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The non monotonic relationship between wage inequality within groups and skill 
supply stems from the erosion and discouragement effects due to ability-biased technical 
change. For low levels of the growth rate (below its stationary value), the erosion effect 
on the efficiency units of labour supplied by ordinary-ability workers is low. Since their 
relative income is relatively high, there are enough incentives to become educated for 
ordinary-ability individuals, and the growth rate is enhanced. Yet, this increase in the 
growth rate in turn erodes their relative efficiency units of labour. Due to a 
discouragement effect, the number of skilled workers with ordinary ability then 
decreases, which depresses the growth rate. The technological transition therefore is 
oscillatory, implying a non monotonic relationship between skill supply wage inequality 
and the rate of technical change. 
This model can contribute to explain the observation that in the United States and 
Great Britain, the skill premium declined when supply grew at its highest pace (1970s) 
and inversely, the highest growth in the supply of skilled labour occurred when the skill 
premium was the lowest (1980s). In the model, periods of high (respectively low) 
growth increase (respectively reduce) wage inequality between and within groups. The 
rise (respectively reduction) in within groups inequality reduces (respectively increases) 
the incentives to become educated for workers with ordinary ability, thereby exerting an 
upward (respectively downward) pressure on between groups inequality. Ability-biased 
 
gt+1 = f(gt)
gt+1  
gt+1 = gt  
gt  
g0  g*  
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technical change hence induces a non monotonic relationship between relative demand, 
relative supply and growth. Bursts of technical change widens the gap between the 
returns to skills of high-ability workers and that of ordinary-ability workers. The erosion 
effect reduces the number of skilled workers with ordinary ability and rises inequality 
between groups. The increase in wage inequality between and within groups comes 
from the same source: the increase in the demand for ability in periods of technological 
acceleration.  
 
6  Conclusion 
 
The theoretical framework proposed in this article enables to characterize the links 
between technical change and inequality between and within groups via two 
relationships. First, any increase in the growth rate, if it increases the returns to ability, 
increases inequality both between and within groups. Second, an increase in within 
groups inequality reduces the incentives to become educated for workers with ordinary 
ability. This model reproduces a stylized version of the evolution of the relative demand 
and supply of skills major OECD countries since the 1970s. Slow growth goes along 
with low inequality and relatively high supply of skilled labour. Inversely, an 
acceleration in ability-biased technical change induces high inequality and lower supply 
of skilled labour. 
The results highlight that, when education acts as a signalling device of ability, the 
supply response to skill-biased technical change is conditioned by its impact on within 
groups inequality. There is no opposition between the forces that determine supply and 
the forces that determine demand, but rather interaction between both. Periods of high 
within groups inequality reduce the incentives to acquire skills and increase inequality 
between groups. The existence of (and the rise in) within groups inequality reduces the 
marginal benefit of education for individuals with ordinary ability, thereby exerting a 
discouragement effect to become educated for these workers. 
This model however does not explain why, with an apparent similar technological 
bias, European economies witnessed a far lower of inequality than the United States in 
the 1980s. A possible argument is to consider that it is unemployment rather than 
inequality that increased in Europe. To explain this phenomenon, one should incorporate 
imperfect wage setting in order to account for the institutional environment and 
endogenize the unemployment rate. This constitutes an area for future research. 
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7  Appendix 
7.1  Growth rates of GDP and Labour Supply 
Table I reports the annual average growth rates of the Gross Domestic Product in per 
cent and are drawn from the OECD Productivity Database (September 2004).  
 
Table I: Annual average growth rates of the Gross Domestic Product in per cent 
 
Canada Sweden Spain Finland France Australia United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Germany Italy Japan Norway 
1970-80 4,2 2,0 3,7 3,7 3,3 3,0 2,0 3,3 2,8 3,6 4,5 4,8 
1980-90 2,8 2,2 2,9 3,1 2,5 3,1 2,7 3,3 2,3 2,3 4,0 2,6 
1990-00 2,9 2,0 2,7 2,0 1,9 3,6 2,4 3,3 1,9 1,6 1,5 3,7 
1990-01 2,8 1,9 2,7 1,9 1,9 3,6 2,4 3,1 1,8 1,6 1,4 3,6 
1990-02 2,9 1,9 2,6 1,9 1,8 3,5 2,3 3,0 1,7 1,5 1,2 3,5 
1990-03 2,8 1,9 2,6 1,9 1,7  2,3  1,5 1,4 1,3 3,2 
1990-95 1,7 0,8 1,5 -0,8 1,1 3,3 1,7 2,5 2,1 1,3 1,5 3,9 
1995-00 4,2 3,3 3,8 4,7 2,7 3,9 3,1 4,1 1,8 1,9 1,4 3,6 
1995-01 3,8 2,9 3,7 4,1 2,6 3,9 3,0 3,5 1,6 1,9 1,2 3,5 
1995-02 3,7 2,8 3,4 3,9 2,4 3,7 2,8 3,3 1,4 1,7 1,0 3,2 
1995-03 3,5 2,6 3,3 3,6 2,1  2,7  1,2 1,5 1,2 2,8 
Source: OECD Productivity Database (2004) 
 
Table II reports the annual growth rates of labour supply, the latter being defined by 
OECD as the total hours worked of all persons employed. These data are computed from 
the average hours worked from the OECD Employment Outlook (1996 and 2003). 
 
Table II: Annual average growth rates of hours worked of all persons employed in percent 
 Canada Sweden Spain Finland France Australia United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Germany Italy Japan Norway 
1973-79 -3,5 -6,8  -2,5 -4,8  -5,6 -1,0 -5,6 -8,9 -3,4 -11,4 
1979-83 -3,9 0,1 -3,9 -2,5 -5,6 -2,7 -5,6 -1,2 -1,8 -1,3 -1,5 -1,9 
1983-90 0,4 1,9 -4,3 -3,1 -2,5 7,2 3,1 3,2 -6,8 -1,1 -3,1 -3,7 
1990-00 2,3 6,8 -1,2 -3,0 -7,4 -8,2 -3,7 -6,6 -10,6 -3,3 -10,9 -6,3 
Source:   OECD Employment Outlook (1996 and 2003) 
 
Table III documents the ratio of the relative percentile distribution of gross earnings 
P90/P10 in nine OECD countries.  
 
Table III: Relative percentile of gross earnings P90/P10 
 United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
France  
(73-98) 
Japan  
(75-99) 
Sweden  
(75-98) 
Canada 
(73-94) 
Finland 
(77-99) 
Germany  
(84-98) 
Italy  
(86-96) 
1973-1979 3,72 3,03 3,41 3,00 2,10 3,88    
1979-1983 4,07 2,97 3,36 3,05 2,01 4,24 2,54   
1983-1990 4,20 2,96 3,32 3,15 2,05 4,44 2,50 2,85 2,30 
1990-2000 4,51 2,97 3,15 3,03 2,16 4,21 2,37 2,83 2,36 
Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics (July 2004) 
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7.2  Dynamics and steady-state of the growth rate 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
Let 1t tG g= + . Given (21), we have:  
[ ]1 ( ) (1 ) ( )( )
t
t t
t
GG kM M G
G
µγ λλ+
 
= + − 
 
 
Deriving with respect to tG  and rearranging yields:  
 
 
[ ] [ ]
1
1 ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t
t t
t t t t
t
t t t t
G G
G G
G G G GkM M G kM
G G G G
αµγ λ
µ µ λ λλ α
µ µ λ λ
−
+
 ∂
=  ∂  
   ′ ′ ′ ′ 
+ − − − −   
    


 (24) 
The properties of (.)λ  and (.)µ   in (20) imply that ( ) ( )0 ( ) ( )
t t
t t
G G
G G
µ λ
µ λ
′ ′
≥ ≥   and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t
t t t t
G G G G
G G G G
µ µ λ λ
α
µ µ λ λ
 ′ ′ ′ ′
≥ − − ≥ 
 
 We therefore have:  
 
 
1 0t
t
G
G
+∂ <
∂
 (25) 
The dynamics of the growth rate hence is oscillatory. To determine whether there is 
convergence, we have to show that 1 1t
t
G
G
+∂ <
∂
 Given (25), this is equivalent to show that 
1 1t
t
G
G
+∂ > −
∂
 Rearranging (24), this condition writes  
 
[ ]
[ ]
1
1
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )(1 ) 1( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 (1 ) ( ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) (1 ) ( ) 0( )
t t
t
t t
t t
t t
t t t
t
t t t
t
t
t
G GkM kM M G
G G
G G
G G
G G GkM M G
G G G
G M G
G
α
α
µ λγ λλ λ
µ λ
α
µ λ
λ µ λλ α
γ µ µ λ
λ λλ
−
−
   ′
− + −   
   
 ′ ′
− − < 
 
   ′ ′
⇔ + − − −   
   
 ′
+ − > 
 


 
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The properties of (.)λ  and (.)µ   in (20) imply that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t t
t t t t
G G G G
G G G G
µ λ λ λ
α α α
µ λ λ λ
′ ′ ′ ′
≥ − ≥ − > − +  We therefore have 
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t
t t t
G G G
G G G
µ λ λ
α
µ λ λ
 ′ ′ ′
− − > 
 
 that is:  
 
 
1 1t
t
G
G
+∂ > −
∂
. 
The growth rate hence converges with oscillations to its steady state value. Given that 
1tG +  is monotonically decreasing in tG , its curve will cross the increasing 45
°
 line (for 
which 1t tG G+ = ), and hence the steady-state exists. It remains to show that the 
stationary value of the growth rate 1t tg g g+ = =  belongs to the unit interval, (or 
equivalently that [ ]1 1, 2t tG G G+ = = ∈ ) .  G is defined implicitly by  
 
 
( ) (1 ) ( )( )
GG kM M G
G
µγ λ
λ
 
 = + −   
 
 
Let ( ) ( )H x x F x= − , where [ ]( )( ) (1 ) ( )( )
xF x kM M x
x
µγ λλ
 
= + − 
 
  We have shown that  
1 ( ) 0F x− < <  hence  
 
 ( ) 1 ( ) 0H x F x′ ′= − >  (26) 
Given (2), the steady-state growth rate [ ]1, 2G ∈  if 
1
lim ( ) 1
x
F x
→
>  and 
2
lim ( ) 2
x
F x
→
< . Both 
conditions are verified under assumption (A2), a condition which, as a by-product, also 
rules out the possibility of a negative growth rate even in the short run. Note that both 
conditions are equivalent to 
1
lim ( ) 0
x
H x
→
<  and 
2
lim ( ) 0
x
H x
→
< , which guarantees the 
existence and uniqueness of  G . 
 
